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Abstract
We show that there is no consistent Pareto improvement over any stable mechanism.
We introduce the following weakly consistent Pareto improvement (over the student-
optimal stable matching) requirement: whenever a set of students, each of whom is
assigned to a school that is underdemanded at the student-optimal stable matching, is
removed with their assigned seats, then the assignments of the remaining students do
not change. Our main result is that the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mech-
anism (Kesten in Q J Econ 125(3):1297–1348, 2010) is the unique weakly consistent
Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism.
Keywords Market design · School choice · Consistency · Weak consistency ·
EADAM
JEL Classification C78 · D61 · D78 · I20
1 Introduction
The tradeoff between efficiency and stability has been a central question in the context
of assigning students to schools following the pioneering work of Abdulkadirog˘lu and
Sönmez (2003). A matching is (Pareto) efficient if there is no other matching in which
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at least one student is better off and no student is worse off. Efficiency is attained, for
example, by a serial dictatorship mechanism (Svensson 1999) or Gale’s top trading
cycles mechanism (Shapley and Scarf 1974). On the other hand, stability requires that
the matching is individually rational and there is no student–school pair who prefer
each other to their current matches. The deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) of Gale
and Shapley (1962) produces a stable matching. Furthermore, no mechanism can be
both efficient and stable (Roth 1982). Kesten (2010) addresses the tradeoff between
efficiency and stability by introducing EADAM, the Pareto of which improves over
DA by allowing violation of some student priorities when these violations do not hurt
the students.1
Another desirable property of a mechanism is consistency (Thomson 1990), which
states that when a group of students leaves the market with their assigned seats and
the mechanism is applied to the reduced market, the assignment for the remaining
agents should not change. Consistency can be thought of as a robustness check when
students can trade their assigned seats using the same mechanism. It is known that
DA is not consistent (Toda 2006; Afacan and Dur 2017). Our first result shows that no
mechanism which Pareto improves over DA is consistent (Theorem 1). Since EADAM
Pareto improves over DA, an implication of our result is that EADAM is not consistent
(Corollary 1).2
Next, we provide a weaker consistency property. Given a matching, we say that a
school is underdemanded at the given matching if no student strictly prefers it to his
assigned school—underdemanded in the sense that no student prefers those schools to
his assigned school. Using this concept, we introduce the following weak consistency
property of a mechanism. Run a mechanism for a given market. Consider a subset of
the students who are assigned by this mechanism to schools that are underdemanded
at the DA outcome. This mechanism is weakly consistent (w.r.t. DA) if removing these
students with their assigned seats and applying the mechanism to the reduced market do
not change the assignments of the remaining students.3 We take DA as a benchmark
and look for Pareto improvements. Since any school that is underdemanded at DA
remains underdemanded at any Pareto improvement, and any student who is assigned
to an underdemanded school at DA remains assigned to the same school at any Pareto
improvement (Tang and Yu 2014, Lemma 1), the requirement that we only remove a
set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that is underdemanded at DA,
makes sense, as these schools remain underdemanded for any mechanism that we
consider. In other words, the match between a student and an underdemanded school
at DA is an irrelevant match, since the same match happens at any Pareto improvement
over DA, and such a mechanism should operate independently from these irrelevant
matches.
1 In fact, Kesten (2010) allows for the possibility that only some, but not all, students consent to the violation
of their priorities and proposes a class of mechanisms. Unless otherwise noted, we use EADAM to refer to
the case when all students consent.
2 For any set of consenting students, EADAM Pareto improves over DA. Therefore, EADAM is not con-
sistent even when some of the students do not consent.
3 Alternatively, we can define weak consistency of a mechanism w.r.t. the mechanism itself. We discuss
this at the end of Sect. 3.
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Let us call a mechanism a weakly consistent Pareto improvement over DA, if it
Pareto improves over DA and is weakly consistent w.r.t. DA. Our main finding is that
EADAM is the unique weakly consistent Pareto improvement over DA (Theorem 2).
The proof that any weakly consistent Pareto improvement must be EADAM follows
from a simplified definition of EADAM proposed by Tang and Yu (2014). They show
that EADAM can be produced as follows: Run DA once and identify underdemanded
schools. Make the matches of underdemanded schools permanent and remove them
from the market with the assigned students. Rerun this procedure until all students
and schools are matched. Furthermore, Kesten (2010) proves that EADAM Pareto
improves over DA. The more difficult part of the proof is showing that EADAM
satisfies weak consistency w.r.t. DA. By the definition of EADAM, it is easy to see
that if all students who are assigned to underdemanded schools at DA are removed with
their assigned seats, then the matching for the remaining students does not change.
However, it is not clear whether the assignments of the remaining students will change
if some of the students, in particular only one, who are assigned to underdemanded
schools at DA are removed with their assigned seats, which we establish in Appendix
A. One implication of Theorem 2 is that DA is not weakly consistent w.r.t. itself.
Recently, EADAM has received attention in the literature (Dur et al. 2019; Troyan
et al. 2018; Tang and Zhang 2017; Ehlers and Morrill 2017). These papers weaken
stability and provide a different justification of EADAM. Instead, we introduce weak
consistency and characterize EADAM as the unique weakly consistent Pareto improve-
ment over DA.
Kesten (2010), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009), and Alva and Manjunath (2019) show
that there is no strategy-proof Pareto improvement over DA. We also study Pareto
improvement over DA but instead of imposing strategy-proofness, we impose weak
consistency and identify EADAM as the unique mechanism with these properties.
Other related literature includes Toda (2006), who characterizes the core of match-
ing markets using consistency. Ergin (2002) shows that DA is consistent if, and only
if, the capacity-priority structure satisfies acyclicity.4 In another recent paper, Afacan
and Dur (2017) show that no stable mechanism is consistent.
2 Model
There exist a finite set of students, S, and a finite set of schools, C. Each student s ∈ S
has a preference ranking Rs over C ∪ {s},5 where s represents an outside option
for the student, which can be homeschooling, a private school, or the neighborhood
school. The strict part of preference ranking Rs is denoted by Ps , so if c1, c2 ∈ C∪{s},
c1 = c2, and c1 Rs c2, then c1 Ps c2. School c is acceptable to student s if the student
4 A student s is an interrupter at a market at school c if there is a step in DA where student s is tentatively
accepted by school c but another student is rejected, while at a later step, student s is also rejected (Kesten
2010). Acyclicity is equivalent to the condition that there are no interrupters at any market.
5 Formally, a preference ranking over C ∪ {s} is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation
over C ∪{s}. Binary relation Rs over C ∪{s} is complete if, for every c1, c2 ∈ C ∪{s}, c1 Rs c2 or c2 Rs c1.
It is transitive if, for every c1, c2, c3 ∈ C ∪ {s}, c1 Rs c2 and c2 Rs c3 imply c1 Rs c3. It is anti-symmetric
if, for every c1, c2 ∈ C ∪ {s}, c1 Rs c2 and c2 Rs c1 imply c1 = c2.
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prefers it to the outside option, that is, c Ps s. Each school c ∈ C has a capacity
qc ∈ N, which is the maximum number of students that the school can admit, and a
priority ranking c over the set of students and an empty seat, S ∪ {c}.6 Student s is
acceptable to school c if the school ranks the student above the option of having an
empty seat, i.e., s c c.
The admission policy of school c ∈ C is represented by a choice rule Chc : 2S →
2S , which maps each nonempty set S ⊆ S of students to a subset Chc(S) ⊆ S of
chosen students such that the number of chosen students does not exceed the capacity,
that is, |Chc(S)| ≤ qc. For each school c ∈ C, Chc is responsive to the priority
ranking c, i.e., for each S ⊆ S, Chc(S) is constructed by choosing the highest-
priority acceptable students in S until qc students are chosen or no acceptable student
is left.
A market is a tuple (S, C, (Rs)s∈S , (qc,c)c∈C). Sometimes, we fix the primitives
of a market other than the student-preference relation profile R ≡ (Rs)s∈S and the
school-priority ranking profile ≡ (c)c∈C . In this case, we call the pair (R,) the
market.
A matching μ is a function on the set of all agents such that
• for every student s, μ(s) ∈ C ∪ {s},
• for every school c, μ(c) ⊆ S such that |μ(c)| ≤ qc, and
• for every student s and school c, s ∈ μ(c) if, and only if, c = μ(s).
In words, every student is matched to a school or unmatched, and every school is
matched to a set of students that has a cardinality not greater than the capacity of the
school. The last condition checks the feasibility of the matching so that a student is
matched with a school if, and only if, the student is in the set that is matched with the
school.
A matching μ Pareto dominates a matching ν if every student s weakly prefers
μ(s) to ν(s) and at least one student strictly prefers μ(s) to ν(s). A matching μ is
Pareto efficient if it is not Pareto dominated.
A matching μ is stable if it satisfies the following two conditions.
• Individual rationality: for every student s, μ(s) Rs s, and for every school c,
Chc(μ(c)) = μ(c), and
• No blocking: there exists no student–school pair (s, c) such that c Ps μ(s) and
s ∈ Chc(μ(c) ∪ {s}).
Individual rationality for a student means that the student’s match is weakly better
than her outside option. For a school, it implies that the school would like to keep
all its students. Since every school’s choice rule is responsive, this means that the
number of students matched to a school is weakly smaller than its capacity and that
each student matched with the school is acceptable to it. No blocking rules out the
existence of a blocking student–school pair such that the student prefers the school to
her assignment and the school finds the student acceptable and either it has an empty
seat for the student or prefers the student to one of its assigned students.
The deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) produces a stable
matching. It has been used in different school districts to match students to schools.
6 The priority ranking c is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation over S ∪ {c}.
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Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DA)
Step 1. Each student proposes to her top-ranked acceptable school. If there is no
such school, then she is assigned to her outside option. Each school c considers the set
of proposals that it receives, say A1(c). It tentatively accepts Chc(A1(c)). It rejects
all other proposals. If there is no rejection, then stop.
Step t ≥ 2. Each student who is rejected at Step t − 1 proposes to her top-ranked
acceptable school among the ones that have not rejected her yet. If there is no such
school, then she is assigned to her outside option. Each school c considers the set
of students that it tentatively accepted at Step t − 1 together with students that have
proposed at Step t , say At (c). It tentatively accepts Chc(At (c)), and rejects other
proposals. If there is no rejection, then stop.
DA produces the student-optimal stable matching for any market: this is the
most preferred stable matching for all students (Gale and Shapley 1962). As a result,
sometimes we refer to DA as the student-optimal stable mechanism. Even though the
DA outcome is stable, it may not be Pareto efficient. To improve DA’s efficiency, Kesten
(2010) provides another mechanism called efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance
mechanism (EADAM), which works by removing certain schools from the preference
orderings of certain students and rerunning DA at the new market. Instead of providing
Kesten’s original definition, we use a simplified version provided by Tang and Yu
(2014).
Given a matching μ, a school c is underdemanded at μ if no student s strictly
prefers c to μ(s). The outside option of each student is also underdemanded.
Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (EADAM)
Step 0. Run DA for the market (R,).
Step t ≥ 1. Identify underdemanded schools at the outcome of Step t − 1 of
DA. Settle underdemanded schools with their matched students permanently. Remove
these schools and students from the market. Stop if there are no remaining schools.
Otherwise, run DA for the remaining market and move to the next step, Step t + 1.
EADAM stops in finitely many steps and the outcome is Pareto efficient (Kesten
2010; Tang and Yu 2014).
We illustrate EADAM using the following example. We come back to this example
in the next section.
Example 1 Let S = {s1, s2, s3} and C = {c1, c2, c3}. Each school has capacity one.
Let the student preferences and the school priorities be as follows.
Rs1 Rs2 Rs3 c1 c2 c3
c1 c1 c2 s3 s2 s1
c3 c2 c1 s1 s3 s2
c2 c3 c3 s2 s1 s3
s1 s2 s3 c1 c2 c3
At Step 0, we run DA. The outcome is {(s1, c3), (s2, c2), (s3, c1)}.
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At Step 1, we first identify the underdemanded schools at the outcome of Step 0.
Student s1 prefers school c1 to her matched school c3. Student s3 prefers school c2 to
her matched school c1. Therefore, schools c1 and c2 are not underdemanded. However,
no student prefers school c3 to her assigned school, so school c3 is underdemanded.
Then, match school c3 and student s1 permanently and remove them from the market.
Finally, we run DA for the remaining market and obtain {(s2, c1), (s3, c2)}.
At Step 2, we identify the underdemanded schools at the DA outcome of Step 1.
Since both students get their top schools, both schools are underdemanded. We match
these schools and students permanently. Since there are no schools remaining, we end
the algorithm. The outcome is {(s1, c3), (s2, c1), (s3, c2)}.
A mechanism ϕ takes a market m = (S, C, (Rs)s∈S , (qc,c)c∈C) as an input and
produces a matching as an output. Given a market m, let ϕ(m) denote the matching
produced by mechanism ϕ at market m. The outcomes for student s and school c
produced by mechanism ϕ at market m are denoted by ϕs(m) and ϕc(m), respectively.
A mechanism is stable if it produces a stable matching at every market. A mechanism
ϕ is consistent if, for every market m = (S, C, (Rs)s∈S , (qc,c)c∈C), set of students
S ⊆ S, and student s′ ∈ S \ S,
ϕs′(m) = ϕs′(S \ S, C, (Rs)s∈S\S, (qc − |ϕc(m) ∩ S| ,c)c∈C)).
In words, a mechanism is consistent whenever a set of students take their assigned seats
under ϕ and leave; the mechanism ϕ keeps the matchings the same for the reduced
market with the remaining students and schools with reduced capacities (Thomson
1990). That is, when some students leave with their assigned seats, the mechanism
still delivers the same outcome for the remaining students. Consistency can be thought
of as a robustness property when any subset of students can trade their assigned seats
using the same mechanism.
3 Results
A mechanism ϕ Pareto improves over another mechanism ϕ′ if at each market m,
either ϕ(m) = ϕ′(m)or ϕ(m)Pareto dominatesϕ′(m).7 A mechanismϕ is a consistent
Pareto improvement over mechanism ϕ′ if mechanism ϕ is consistent and Pareto
improves over mechanism ϕ′.
We show that no stable mechanism has a consistent Pareto improvement.
Theorem 1 No stable mechanism has a consistent Pareto improvement.
Proof We prove a stronger result. We show that even on the domain of markets where
all students are acceptable at each school, no stable mechanism has a consistent Pareto
improvement. Let ϕ be a stable mechanism. Suppose, for contradiction, that mech-
anism ϕ′ is a consistent Pareto improvement over ϕ. Since no stable mechanism is
consistent (Afacan and Dur 2017),8 ϕ′ is not stable. Therefore, there exists a market m
7 Note that each mechanism Pareto improves over itself.
8 In the model of Afacan and Dur (2017), all the students are acceptable at each school.
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such that ϕ′(m) is not a stable matching. Since ϕ′ is a Pareto improvement over a stable
mechanism, ϕ′(m) is individually rational for all students. Likewise it is also individ-
ually rational for schools since schools find all students acceptable in this domain.
Therefore, there exists a blocking pair for ϕ′(m) in market m.
Suppose that there exists a student s who blocks with an empty seat at a school c,
i.e., c Ps ϕ′s(m), |ϕ′c(m)| < qc, and s c c. Let m′ be the reduced market after all
students except student s leave with their ϕ′(m) assignments. Note that m′ includes
only student s and at least one seat of school c. There is a unique stable matching in
m′, which is ϕ(m′), such that student s is assigned to a school which he weakly prefers
to school c. (In fact, s is assigned to the best school at which he is acceptable and there
is an available seat.) Since mechanism ϕ′ is a Pareto improvement over ϕ, we have
ϕ′s(m′) Rs c. Then, ϕ′s(m′) = ϕ′s(m), contradicting consistency of ϕ′.
Suppose that there exists a student s who blocks with a school c without an empty
seat, i.e., there exists a student s′ such that c Ps ϕ′s(m), ϕ′s′(m) = c, and s c s′.
Let m′ be the market after all the students except students s and s′ leave with their
ϕ′(m) assignments. Note that m′ includes only students s and s′ and at least one seat of
school c. Since in m′, student s has the highest priority at c, in every stable matching,
in particular in ϕ(m′), s is assigned to a school that he weakly prefers to school c.
Since ϕ′ is a Pareto improvement over ϕ, we have ϕ′s(m′) Rs c. Then ϕ′s(m′) = ϕ′s(m),
contradicting consistency of ϕ′. unionsq
Theorem 1 can also be shown using Lemma 5.7 in Toda (2006). One immediate
corollary is the following:
Corollary 1 EADAM is not consistent.
Theorem 1 also implies that some of the mechanisms considered in the literature are
not consistent. For example, a mechanism considered is Gale’s top trading cycles mech-
anism when students use their DA assignments as their initial endowments. Another
corollary is that this mechanism is also not consistent.
Even though consistency is a desirable property, it may be too strong for the robust-
ness of a mechanism. Some students may not be able to renegotiate their assignments
because they are matched with schools that are deemed undesirable. To this end,
we weaken consistency by allowing only a subset of students to renegotiate. We
formalize this idea as follows. A mechanism ϕ is weakly consistent w.r.t. mech-
anism ϕ′ if, whenever a set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that
is underdemanded at ϕ′, leaves the market with their assigned seats under ϕ; the
mechanism ϕ keeps the assignments the same for the reduced market with the remain-
ing students and schools with reduced capacities. More formally, for every market
m = (S, C, (Rs)s∈S , (qc,c)c∈C), set of students S ⊆ S such that ϕs(m) is underde-
manded at ϕ′(m) for every student s ∈ S, and student s′ ∈ S \ S,
ϕs′(m) = ϕs′(S \ S, C, (Rs)s∈S\S, (qc − |ϕc(m) ∩ S| ,c)c∈C)).
Note that, equivalently, a mechanism is weakly consistent w.r.t. ϕ′ if, whenever one
student who is assigned to a school that is underdemanded at ϕ′ leaves the market
with his assigned seat, i.e., whenever the student is removed from the market and the
capacity of his assigned school is reduced by one, the assignments of the remaining
students do not change.
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A mechanism ϕ is a weakly consistent Pareto improvement over mechanism ϕ′
if mechanism ϕ Pareto improves over mechanism ϕ′ and is weakly consistent w.r.t.
ϕ′.
Our main result provides a characterization of EADAM using weak consistency.
Theorem 2 EADAM is the only weakly consistent Pareto improvement over DA.
Theorem 2 implies that DA is not weakly consistent w.r.t. itself, since DA Pareto
improves over itself. Every consistent mechanism is also weakly consistent w.r.t. DA,
and, therefore, the well-known Boston mechanism is weakly consistent w.r.t. DA but
does not Pareto improve over DA.9 On the other hand, Gale’s top trading cycles
mechanism, when students use their DA assignments as their initial endowments,
Pareto improves over DA, but it is not weakly consistent w.r.t. DA.
The fact that EADAM is the only mechanism satisfying the two requirements
follows easily by the definition of EADAM. The difficult part of the proof is to show
that EADAM is weakly consistent w.r.t. DA. Again, by the definition of EADAM, it
is easy to see that if all students who are assigned to underdemanded schools at DA
are removed with their assigned seats, then the matching for the remaining students
does not change. However, it is not clear whether the assignments of the remaining
students will change if some of the students, in particular only one, who are assigned
to underdemanded schools at DA are removed with their assigned seats. We provide
the details of the proof in Appendix A.
Note that our weaking of consistency is w.r.t. DA. Alternatively, we can define
weak consistency of a given mechanism w.r.t. the mechanism itself as follows. Run
the mechanism and identify underdemanded schools at the outcome. Remove the
underdemanded schools and their students from the market. Run the mechanism again.
Then the outcome for the remaining agents should not change. The next example
shows that EADAM is not weakly consistent w.r.t. EADAM, even though it is weakly
consistent w.r.t. DA.
Example 2 Consider the setting in Example 1. The DA outcome for the original market
is {(s1, c3), (s2, c2), (s3, c1)}. The only underdemanded school at DA is c3. On the
other hand, the EADAM outcome is {(s1, c3), (s2, c1), (s3, c2)}. If we remove school
c3 and its EADAM match student s1 from the market and rerun EADAM, then we get
{(s2, c1), (s3, c2)}. The outcome does not change for the remaining agents, which is
an implication of weak consistency w.r.t. DA.
However, at EADAM outcome, there are two underdemanded schools: c2 and c3. If
we remove school c2 and its EADAM match student s3 and run EADAM again, we get
{(s1, c1), (s2, c3)}. The EADAM outcome for student s1 changes in the reduced market.
Therefore, this example also shows that EADAM does not satisfy the alternative
consistency requirement that removing underdemanded schools and their assigned
students at the mechanism should not change the outcome for the remaining agents.
In other words, EADAM is not weakly consistent w.r.t. EADAM.
9 See Dog˘an and Klaus (2018) and Kojima and Ünver (2014) for characterizations of the Boston mechanism
that include consistency.
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4 Conclusion
We have introduced a new axiom called weakly consistent Pareto improvement for
matching markets. Using this axiom, we have provided a characterization of EADAM
(Kesten 2010) as the unique weakly consistent Pareto improvement over DA.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix A Proof of Theorem 2
Step 0: Auxiliary notions and lemmas A well-known property of the DA mecha-
nism, which we call weak monotonicity, will be useful. It requires the following. If
some students leave the market with their DA assignments, i.e., if some students are
removed from the market and the capacities of their DA schools are reduced accord-
ingly, then all the remaining students are weakly better off in the new DA outcome.
Weak monotonicity of DA is shown in Chen (2017) and called “weak consistency,”
which is the terminology that we reserve for our new consistency notion.10
The following lemmas will be useful to prove our results. Lemma 1 is from Tang
and Yu (2014).
Lemma 1 Consider a market m and the DA assignment for this market, DA(m). If
DA(m) is Pareto dominated by another matching μ, then each school c that is under-
demanded in DA(m) is also underdemanded in matching μ, and each student assigned
to school c in DA(m) is also assigned to school c in matching μ.
Lemma 2 Consider a market m and the DA assignment for this market, DA(m). Sup-
pose that market m′ is obtained from market m by removing some students who are
assigned to underdemanded schools in DA(m) together with their DA(m) assign-
ments. Then each school c that is underdemanded in DA(m) is underdemanded also
in DA(m′), and each student who is present in the market m′ and who is assigned to
school c in DA(m) is assigned to c also in DA(m′).
Proof Let S be the set of students who are removed, together with their assignments,
to obtain market m′. By weak monotonicity, each student who is present in m′ weakly
prefers his DA(m′) assignment to his DA(m) assignment. Consider the matching μ
obtained from DA(m′) by adding S and their DA(m) assignments so that each student
in S is matched to his DA(m) assignment at μ, and, for the other students, μ agrees with
DA(m′). Then μ weakly Pareto dominates DA(m) and by Lemma 1, each school c that
is underdemanded in DA(m) is underdemanded also in μ and each student assigned
to school c in DA(m) is assigned to school c also in μ.
Now, note that DA(m′) can be obtained from matching μ by removing students
in S with their assignments. Since the assignments of S are underdemanded at μ,
10 Dog˘an and Yenmez (2018) also note the weak monotonicity of DA.
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the set of underdemanded schools weakly expands, i.e., the set of underdemanded
schools in μ is a subset of the set of underdemanded schools in DA(m′). (It strictly
expands if, at μ, a school is demanded only by students in S). Hence, each school c
that is underdemanded in DA(m) is also underdemanded in DA(m′), and each student
assigned to school c in DA(m) is also assigned to c in DA(m′). unionsq
Lemma 3 states a new property of DA in a similar vein to weak monotonicity,
although it is logically independent from weak monotonicity. The property requires that
if more students with underdemanded seats leave a market with their DA assignments,
then the DA outcome for every other student weakly improves. It does not imply weak
monotonicity because it only focuses on the removal of students who are assigned to
underdemanded schools. Also, the statement would not hold without the requirement
that the removed students are assigned to underdemanded schools.
Lemma 3 Consider a market m with the set of students S and let S′′ ⊆ S′ ⊆ S be
such that each student in S′ is assigned to an underdemanded school in DA(m). Then,
each student in S \ S′ weakly prefers his DA assignment after the students in S′ leave
with their DA(m) assignments to his DA assignment after the students in S′′ leave with
their DA(m) assignments.
Proof Let m be the original market with students S, m′ be the market after the students
in S′ leave with their DA assignments, and m′′ be the market after the students in
S′′ leave with their DA assignments. Let DA(m), DA(m′), and DA(m′′) denote the
associated DA outcomes.
By weak monotonicity of DA, DA(m′′) weakly Pareto dominates DA(m) for the
students in S\S′′. Since each student in S′ \S′′ is assigned to an underdemanded school
in DA(m), the assignments of the students in S′ \ S′′ are the same in DA(m′′) and in
DA(m) by Lemma 1. Note that m′ can be obtained from m′′ by removing the students
in S′ \ S′′ together with their DA(m′′) assignments. Then, by weak monotonicity of
DA, DA(m′) weakly Pareto dominates DA(m′′) for the students in S \ S′. unionsq
Lemma 4 Consider a market m with the set of students S and let S′′ ⊆ S′ ⊆ S be such
that each student in S′ is assigned to an underdemanded school in DA assignment. Let
m′ be the market obtained from market m by removing the students in S′ together with
their DA(m) assignments and let m′′ be the market obtained from market m by removing
the students in S′′ together with their DA(m) assignments. Then, each school c that is
underdemanded in DA(m′′) is underdemanded also in DA(m′), and each student who
is present in the market m′ and who is assigned to school c in DA(m′′) is assigned to
school c also in DA(m′).
Proof By Lemma 2, each student in S′\S′′ is assigned to the same school in DA(m) and
DA(m′′). Consider the matching μ obtained from DA(m′) by adding S′ \ S′′ and their
DA(m) assignments so that each student in S′ \S′′ is matched to his DA(m) assignment
at μ and, for the other students, μ agrees with DA(m′). By Lemma 3, μ weakly Pareto
dominates DA(m′′). Then, by Lemma 1, each school c that is underdemanded in
DA(m′′) is underdemanded also in μ and each student assigned to c in DA(m′′) is
assigned to c also in μ.
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Now, note that DA(m′) can be obtained from μ by removing S′ \ S′′ with their
assignments. Since the assignments of S′ \ S′′ are underdemanded at μ, the set of
underdemanded schools weakly expands, i.e., the set of underdemanded schools in μ
is a subset of the set of underdemanded schools in DA(m′). (It strictly expands if at
μ, a school is demanded only by students in S′ \ S′′.) Hence, each school c that is
underdemanded in DA(m′′) is underdemanded also in DA(m′), and each student who
is present in m′ and who is assigned to c in DA(m′′) is assigned to c also in DA(m′). unionsq
Step 1: EADAM is weakly consistent w.r.t. DA Consider an arbitrary market m
with the EADAM outcome EADAM(m). Suppose that a student s whose EADAM(m)
assignment is underdemanded in the student-optimal stable matching leaves the market
with his EADAM(m) assignment, i.e., student s is removed and the capacity of his
EADAM(m) assignment is decreased by one. Let us call this market m′ and the new
EADAM outcome EADAM(m′).
Since the EADAM(m) assignment of student s is underdemanded at the DA out-
come, in the EADAM(m) student s must be permanently matched to and removed
with his assignment in Round 1.
The following lemma will conclude that EADAM is weakly consistent w.r.t. DA.
Lemma 5 For each r ≥ 1, each school c that is underdemanded in Round r of
EADAM(m) is also underdemanded in Round r of EADAM(m′) and the set of stu-
dents assigned to school c in Round r of EADAM(m) and in Round r of EADAM(m′)
are the same, except that if school c is the EADAM(m) assignment of student s, student
s is not assigned to school c in Round 1 of EADAM(m′). Moreover, each school c that
is underdemanded in Round r of EADAM(m′) but not underdemanded in Round r of
EADAM(m) is underdemanded in Round r + 1 of EADAM(m), and the set of students
assigned to school c in Round r of EADAM(m′) and in Round r + 1 of EADAM(m)
are the same.
Proof The proof is by induction on r . Note that the DA assignment in Round 1 of
EADAM(m′) can be obtained from the DA assignment in Round 1 of EADAM(m) by
removing student s with his DA assignment in Round 1 of EADAM(m) and running
DA with the remaining students and schools. By Lemma 2, each school c that is
underdemanded in Round 1 of EADAM(m) is also underdemanded in Round 1 of
EADAM(m′) and the set of students assigned to c in Round 1 of EADAM(m) and in
Round 1 of EADAM(m′) are the same, except that if c is the EADAM(m) assignment
of s, s is not assigned to c in Round 1 of EADAM(m′).
Consider any school c that is underdemanded in Round 1 of EADAM(m′) but not
in Round 1 of EADAM(m). Note that the DA assignment in Round 2 of EADAM(m)
can be obtained from the DA assignment in Round 1 of EADAM(m) by removing
the students who are matched with underdemanded schools, including student s, with
their assignments, and running DA with the remaining students and schools, while the
DA assignment in Round 1 of EADAM(m′) can be obtained from the DA assignment
in Round 1 of EADAM(m) by removing only Student s with his assignment and
running DA with the remaining students and schools. Then, by Lemma 4, each school
c that is underdemanded in Round 1 of EADAM(m′) is underdemanded in Round 2
of EADAM(m). In particular, each school c that is underdemanded in Round 1 of
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EADAM(m′) but not underdemanded in Round 1 of EADAM(m) is underdemanded
in Round 2 of EADAM(m), and since the students who are assigned to school c in
Round 1 of EADAM(m) are present also in Round 2 of EADAM(m), we also have
that the set of students assigned to c in Round 1 of EADAM(m′) and in Round 2 of
EADAM(m) are the same.
Suppose that the statement is true for each round before Round r > 1. Note that, by
the induction hypothesis, DA assignment in Round r of EADAM(m′) can be obtained
from DA assignment in Round r of EADAM(m) by removing the students who are
matched with underdemanded schools in Round r − 1 of EADAM(m′) but not in
Round r − 1 of EADAM(m), together with their assignments, and re-running DA
with the remaining students and schools. Then, by Lemma 2, each school c that is
underdemanded in Round r of EADAM(m) is also underdemanded in Round r of
EADAM(m′), and the set of students assigned to c in Round r of EADAM(m) and
in Round r of EADAM(m′) are the same. Then, by Lemma 4, each school c that
is underdemanded in Round r of EADAM(m′) is underdemanded in Round r + 1
of EADAM(m). In particular, each school c that is underdemanded in Round r of
EADAM(m′) but not underdemanded in Round r of EADAM(m) is underdemanded
in Round r + 1 of EADAM(m), and since the students who are assigned to school c
in Round r of EADAM(m) are present also in Round r + 1 of EADAM(m), we also
have that the set of students assigned to c in Round r of EADAM(m′) and in Round
r + 1 of EADAM(m) are the same. unionsq
By Lemma 5, it is clear that when student s leaves the market with his EADAM
assignment, the EADAM assignments of the other students do not change.
Step 2: Any weakly consistent Pareto improvement over DA must be EADAM
Consider an arbitrary market m. Let ϕ be a weakly consistent Pareto improvement over
the student optimal stable mechanism. By Lemma 1, all the students who are matched
to an underdemanded school at DA(m) must be matched to the same schools, which
are still underdemanded, at ϕ(m).
Consider the market m′ obtained from market m after all the students who are
matched to an underdemanded school at DA(m) are removed with their assigned seats.
Note that the assignments of the removed students coincide with their assignment at
EADAM(m). Now, by weak consistency of ϕ, the ϕ(m) and ϕ(m′) assignments of the
remaining students are the same. Again, by Lemma 1, all the students who are matched
to an underdemanded school (underdemanded in the market m′) at DA(m′) must be
matched to the same schools, which are still underdemanded, at ϕ(m′). Then, consider
the market m′′ obtained from market m′ after all the students who are matched to an
underdemanded school at DA(m′) are removed with their assigned seats. Note that the
assignments of the removed students coincide with their assignments at EADAM(m)
(where they are matched at Round 2 of the EADAM(m)). Repeatedly applying the
same arguments yields ϕ(m) =EADAM(m).
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